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Abstract 
Unique benefits can be gained by combining advantages of both micro- and 
macrocognitive methods that would otherwise be impossible to gather from either of 
these methods separately. The proposed research examines several cognitive functions 
within one systematic study that combines some empirical investigation with post-hoc 
qualitative assessment to gather knowledge of strategies and computations. Thereby, 
analyzing a larger cognitive system in a standardized way. By analyzing several cognitive 
functions the multifunction mental model hypothesis (MMM) is explored. This 
hypothesis states that performance of one sensemaking operation is predictive of 
performance of other related sensemaking operations. Three additional hypotheses were 
also explored. (2) Through brief instruction and feedback, mental models are developed 
that involve understanding the relational structure between inter-correlated and 
independent feature(s). (3) Understanding of the relational structure of the features can be 
used to make error correction decisions. (4) The strategies that utilize the inter-correlated 
nature of the features can be recognized and verbalized by users. Four Experiments used 
a multi-cue probabilistic weather forecasting task. Evidence from Experiments 1-4 
supported the MMM hypothesis. Systematic variability in probability estimation by using 
differentially weighted features and inter-correlated features were related to evacuation 
decisions, error detection, and error correction. Results also supported hypotheses 2-4. 
The present research provides evidence which supports the integration of micro- and 
macrocognitive methods for a richer understanding of cognitive function in complex 
sociotechnical systems.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Research on complex cognitive function has involved a tension between 
understanding cognitive function in naturalistic contexts and using laboratory methods to 
replicate and isolate that cognitive function for careful study (Gozli, 2017; Kingstone, 
Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008; McDermott, 2011; Newell, 1973). Experimental 
psychologists often use laboratory methods to often deal with micro- aspects of cognition 
in attention, decisions, memory, problem-solving, prediction, and judgments  (Cacciabue 
& Hollnagel, 1995; Ebbinghaus, 1913; Fitts, 1946; Shipley, 1961). Analyzing micro 
aspects of cognition is valuable and necessary, but not sufficient. Frequently, methods 
used in the microcognitive paradigm analyze one or two cognitive functions often in the 
form of simple linear causal chains (Klein & Hoffman, 2008). Using this reductionist 
approach is valuable for gaining large amounts of information about micro aspects of 
cognition (Klein et al., 2003). However, while the microcognitive paradigm provides 
valuable information about isolated aspects, it may come at the cost of discovering 
emergent processes and abilities when analyzed together in context (Gozli, 2017).  
Today, this tension characterizes research on cognitive function.  At one end, 
applied researchers (including clinical psychologists, education research, 
Industrial/Organizational research, and Human Factors, and related fields) often focus on 
macro-level processes that emerge from the combination of many low-level processes. In 
particular, cognitive systems engineering uses naturalistic studies to analyze how 
subcomponents fit together in context (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006; Klein & 
Hoffman, 2008). However, some have argued that naturalistic approaches can lose the 
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assurance of well-designed highly controlled experiments; namely, the ability to draw 
causal inferences (Kingstone et al., 2008; McDermott, 2011). They are also less equipped 
to establish the same level of fidelity achieved in laboratory settings. In this thesis, I 
argue that unique benefits can be gained by combining parts of both methods, resulting in 
advantages that would otherwise be impossible to gather from implementing either of 
these methods independently. This approach examines several cognitive functions within 
one systematic study that combines some empirical investigation with post-hoc 
qualitative assessment to gather knowledge of strategies and computations. Thereby, 
analyzing a larger cognitive system in a standardized way. 
One integrative perspective for understanding higher-level cognition in context 
has been called sensemaking. Sensemaking has been defined as internal and external 
function performed for the purpose of forming a deeper understanding, so that one can 
act effectively. The sensemaking process is accomplished, in part, through the supporting 
process that is ‘mental models’ (Kaste, 2012; Klein & Hoffman, 2008; Klein, Moon, & 
Hoffman, 2006b)1. Sensemaking is responsible for a number of operations such as how 
people comprehend, explain, make inferences, detect anomalies, diagnose errors, make 
predictions, and learn  (Klein & Hoffman, 2008; Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006a; 
Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Evaluating the role 
                                                 
1 The concept of the ‘mental model’ has been distinguished from similar concepts such as 
a ‘frame’ (Klein, Phillips, Rall, & Peluso, 2007). This will be discussed in further detail 
later on.  
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mental models play in these sensemaking operations is valuable for making inferences 
about how performance of these operations could be improved.  
This thesis focuses on evaluating several of these valuable sensemaking 
operations. I will report on the results of a series of experiments in which participants 
interacted with, and made predictions about, a simulated weather forecasting system. I 
hypothesize that a variety of different functions, supported by the process of 
sensemaking, in this task will draw on common aspects of a mental model of the 
simulated weather forecasting system. In other words, I hypothesize people have different 
mental models that range in their quality of the intelligent tool that they represent, in this 
case a simulated weather forecasting system, and that different chunks of those mental 
models might be valuable for certain relatable tasks. Consequently, I predict that, to the 
extent there are systematic individual differences in performance on some components of 
the task, those who perform better will also perform better on other operations of 
sensemaking. I term this prediction as the Multifunction Mental Model Hypothesis 
(MMM).  
This is not to say that mental models are not dynamic and cannot change, nor that 
a different mental model could not be chosen entirely. In fact evidence suggests mental 
models are elaborated and refined (Johnson-Laird, 2005; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). 
However, simply because a mental model of an intelligent tool changes does not mean 
that functions used to operate the intelligent tool are not supported by the same parts or 
aspects of the mental model. It only implies that a new or refined mental model replaces 
the previous mental model. 
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To explore and test this hypothesis, I will present four experiments which were 
designed to evaluate several sensemaking operations, including: learning relations 
between variables (i.e. function learning), decision making, forecasting, system error 
detection, and system error correction. In contrast to traditional experimental psychology 
experiments that have studied these operations in isolation, I will examine how these 
operations are supported by a common knowledge base and how they are related. 
Analyzing sensemaking operations in weather forecasting is an ideal space for combining 
methods of both the micro- and macrocognitive paradigms. A number of micro- and 
macrocognitive studies have been conducted in weather forecasting (Gluck & Bower, 
1988; Gluck, Shohamy, & Myers, 2002; Hoffman, LaDue, Trafton, Mogil, & Roebber, 
2017). However, consistent with the microcognitive paradigm these microcognitive 
studies have not evaluated a larger cognitive system, merely micro aspects of that system 
such as category learning (Gluck et al., 2002). A number of macrocognitive studies have 
also been conducted in more naturalistic contexts (Hoffman et al., 2017). However, these 
studies are not able to achieve the same level of fidelity as can be achieved within the lab.  
Therefore, there is an opportunity to expand upon previous work.  
           In addition to the MMM hypothesis, three other hypotheses are also proposed. The 
second hypothesis is that through brief instruction and feedback, mental models are 
developed that involve understanding the relational structure between inter-correlated and 
independent feature(s). The third hypothesis is that understanding of the relational 
structure of the features can be used to make error correction decisions. The last 
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hypothesis is that the strategies that utilize the inter-correlated nature of the features can 
be recognized and verbalized by users.  
 Exploring error detection, diagnosis, and correction by using inter-correlated 
features is valuable. Across many naturalistic contexts—including weather forecasting—
the features used for error detection, diagnosis, and correction are inter-correlated. In 
order to help explain error detection and diagnosis by using inter-correlated features I will 
provide an illustrative example. An easy way to do that is to demonstrate inter-correlation 
as a result of location. Imagine three weather sensors located at Northern Michigan 
University (NMU). Now imagine three weather sensors located 100 miles away at 
Michigan Technological University (MTU). Whether these sensors were reporting 
information on temperature, rain fall, or cloud coverage it is highly likely that the sensors 
located at the same university are reporting the same information. For example, all three 
sensors will likely all be reporting snowfall or all three sensors will be reporting rain. If 
one of the sensors reported sunshine and the other two sensors in the same location 
reported rainfall one might think there is an error in the sensor reporting the inconsistent 
information. However, if the three sensors at NMU reported sunshine and the three 
sensors at MTU reported snowfall you wouldn’t necessarily think that there was an error 
with the sensors. This is because the information reported from the sensors in the same 
location are inter-correlated while the information reported from the sensors located at 
NMU versus the information being reported from MTU are relatively independent. In 
order to accurately detect, diagnose, and correct an error by using inter-correlated 
features it requires a different kind of strategy and mental computation compared to 
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diagnosing errors by using independent features alone. Therefore, it is valuable to 
determine (1) if operates can learn the relational structure of the inter-correlated features 
(2) if that understanding can be utilized for detecting, diagnosing, and correcting errors 
and (3) if this strategy can be recognized and verbalized.  
 In this thesis I argue that studying mental models in the lab utilizes advantages of 
both micro- and macrocognitive paradigms. Studying mental models by combining these 
methods provides an opportunity to analyze how different sub components of cognition 
fit together in a larger system that is sensemaking in a systematic way. The MMM 
hypothesis is also explored; those who perform better in one sensemaking operation will 
also perform better on other operations of sensemaking. Implications of this hypothesis, 
such as training, is also explored.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The outline of this literature review is as follows. First, I briefly review the 
definitions of micro- and macrocognition and their distinguishing features. Reviewing the 
micro- and macrocognitive paradigms is valuable for demonstrating their strengths and 
weaknesses and for arguing why combining methods from each paradigm creates unique 
advantages. I then provide a review of the definition of the integrative process under 
investigation—sensemaking. This review of what sensemaking is and how the 
sensemaking process operates lays the foundation to understand the role mental models 
play during the sensemaking process. Finally, the definition of mental model and its role 
within error management is discussed. This review is valuable for providing support for 
the MMM hypothesis and demonstrating some of its potential implications in an applied 
context.  
Distinguishing Microcognition from Macrocognition 
Microcognition and macrocognition are complementary paradigms of research 
(Klein et al., 2003). However, to better understand this it is helpful to examine and define 
each perspective more clearly. Microcognition is the study of invariant processes often in 
the form of binary oppositions such as: massed vs. distributed practice, serial vs. parallel 
processing, exhaustive vs. self-terminating search, single code vs. multiple code, and so 
on (Cacciabue & Hollnagel, 1995; Klein et al., 2003; Newell, 1973). The study of 
microcognition often utilizes college students in controlled artificial laboratory settings 
(Smieszek & Rußwinkel, 2013). One of the advantages of microcognitive study is 
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internal validity, or the ability to draw causal inference (McDermott, 2011). Convenient 
and large samples are useful when analyzing the effects of several independent variables 
on a dependent variable, which requires much larger sample sizes in order to conduct 
more complex statistical analyses.  
In comparison, macrocognition is the framework for describing cognition as it 
naturally occurs (Klein et al., 2003; Schraagen, Klein, & Hoffman, 2008). The study of 
macrocognition focuses on the performance of complex human-machine systems as a 
whole (Smieszek & Rußwinkel, 2013). To accomplish this goal, researchers often 
analyze subject matter experts within naturalistic contexts using cognitive task analysis 
methods (Crandall et al., 2006; Klein & Hoffman, 2008; Klein et al., 2003). 
Macrocognitive research includes topics such as naturalistic decision making, planning, 
problem detection, coordination, adaptation, and sensemaking (Klein, Pliske, Crandall, & 
Woods, 2005; Klein et al., 2003). Although many of these topics are also studied from a 
microcognitive perspective there are two typical differences. (1) Reliance on studying the 
functions in a natural context, and (2) examining how multiple microcognitive functions 
interact to produce emergent complex behavior.  
Micro- and macrocognition are not antagonist paradigms of research (Smieszek & 
Rußwinkel, 2013). Rather, each can be used to inform and inspire the other (Klein et al., 
2003). Some have suggested a bottom up approach; start with microcognitive phenomena 
to inspire research in macrocognitive function (Klein et al., 2003). While others have 
suggested that by first observing phenomena as it naturally occurs we are more likely to 
create universally valid theories (Kingstone et al., 2008). Theories derived from 
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phenomena observed in naturalistic contexts will likely be more robust compared to 
phenomena only analyzed within the lab. Effects discovered within the lab may be so 
sensitive to other variables within more naturalistic contexts that the same effects may 
never be observed in those more naturalistic contexts (Kingstone et al., 2008).  
As mentioned above, there are two main distinctions between micro- and 
macrocognition: analyzing the system as a whole and analyzing the phenomena in 
context. The present research focuses on the integrated cognitive system, but does not 
focus on cognition in context. Creating naturalistic conditions in the lab is challenging 
(Schraagen et al., 2008). However, consistent with the recommendations provided by 
Kingstone et al., (2008) the emergent process under investigation, sensemaking, is based 
on the expansive research conducted in naturalistic settings (Hoffman et al., 2017; Kaste, 
2012). Mental models used by experts in weather forecasting have been observed in 
complex naturalistic environments (Hoffman et al., 2017). These mental models are used 
for a number of sensemaking operations. However, testing the interactions and relations 
of several related sensemaking operations has yet to be explored in the lab. I’m 
attempting to analyze a larger cognitive system within the lab. This fills a valuable gap 
because the nature of the microcognitive paradigm is fundamentally reductionist. This 
reductionist approach misses the opportunity to analyze the fluctuations and interactions 
between the primary functions/behavior and their supporting functions (Klein & 
Hoffman, 2008). Such as the use of mental models for various related sensemaking 
operations.  
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What is sensemaking? 
 From military operations, to leadership, to weather forecasting, researchers are 
studying the role of sensemaking on vital operations (Alberts & Garstka, 2004; Ancona, 
2012; Hoffman et al., 2017). Sensemaking has been studied from diverse disciplinary 
backgrounds. There is not one unified definition of sensemaking accepted across 
disciplines (Weick, 1995). It is beyond the scope of the present paper to review all 
definitions of sensemaking2. However, since the primary focus of the present paper is on 
the role sensemaking plays in complex human-machine systems, it is more valuable to 
review what some notable systems engineers’ perspective is on sensemaking.  
 In their seminal paper, Klein, Moon, and Hoffman (2006a) provide a thorough 
investigation as to what is meant when researchers say ‘sensemaking.’ The authors 
distinguish their definition from previous definitions such as “how people make sense out 
of their experience in the world,” indicating that this type of definition is too broad and 
could encompass years of previous research in concepts such as creativity, curiosity, 
comprehension, and situation awareness. Rather, the authors define sensemaking as “a 
motivated, continuous effort to understand connections (which can be among people, 
places, and events) in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively” (Klein et 
al., 2006a, p. 71).  
                                                 
2 See (Dervin & Naumer, 2009) for review on approaches of sensemaking. 
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 Based on previous experience, when an operator approaches a system they have a 
frame (which is related to yet distinct from the concept of mental model). Sensemaking is 
required when there is some kind of ambiguity, complexity, or anomaly (without which 
there would be nothing to make sense of). Within a socio-technical system this occurs 
when feedback from an intelligent tool is inconsistent with the operators’ current frame. 
An operator could choose to ignore the anomaly. However, if the operator does not 
ignore the anomaly then both mental mechanisms and external behavior may be required 
to increase their understanding of the anomaly which can elaborate an existing frame or 
choose a new frame entirely. Across the literature of sensemaking, many support the 
notion that sensemaking is not limited to only internal mechanisms but rather 
sensemaking also consists of behaviors (Dervin, 1983; Pirolli & Russell, 2011; Weick et 
al., 2005). This could be in the form of communication. Some have gone as far as to say 
sensemaking involves any activity performed for the purpose of “collecting and 
organizing information for deeper understanding” (Pirolli & Russell, 2011, p. 1). 
Somehow an operator needs to go through a process of reconciling what he/she already 
knows about the system (which is in the form of a frame) with the new information that 
does not currently fit within their existing understanding (or frame). This is the process of 
sensemaking. This processes is depicted in the data/frame model (Klein et al., 2006b).  
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Mental Models  
Without mental models many of the functions of sensemaking would not be 
possible (Fallon, Murphy, Zimmerman, & Mueller, 2010; Klein et al., 2006b)3. Mental 
models support vital functions such as reasoning, explaining, and predicting (Johnson-
Laird, 2001, 2006; Jones, Ross, Lynam, Perez, & Leitch, 2011; Rouse & Morris, 1986). 
Some dispute the existence of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983), however, the 
continually growing empirical and theoretical evidence provides strong support for their 
existence (Gentner & Stevens, 2014; Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2005; Klein & Hoffman, 
2008). Similarly to sensemaking, the definition of ‘mental model’ is controversial 
(Moray, 1999; Revell & Stanton, 2012; Richardson & Ball, 2009; Rouse & Morris, 
1986).  
Before reviewing what mental models are, it is valuable to review what they are 
not. Some scholars view mental models as only a store of knowledge. Defining mental 
models as collections of knowledge has been considered as whole a class of definitions 
for mental models (Schumacher & Czerwinski, 1992). However, I argue that mental 
models are not mere collections of knowledge. Specifically, defining mental models in 
this way neglects the relational structure of mental models (Craik, 1943). Defining mental 
models as only knowledge stores results in a loss of utility by neglecting many of their 
functions such as problem solving and prediction (Rouse & Morris, 1986). Both 
                                                 
3 See Rouse and Morris (1986) for a review of the diverse definitions of mental models.  
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empirical and theoretical research has suggested mental models are used for these and 
other vital functions (Gentner & Stevens, 2014; Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2005; Rouse & 
Morris, 1986). Mental models are also distinct from a ‘frame’ (Klein et al., 2006a). A 
frame has been defined as “a structure for accounting for the data and guiding the search 
for more data.” (Klein et al., 2007, p. 118). In other words, a mental model is similar to 
the concept of a frame but a frame has some distinct aspects to it. Such as, taking the 
form of a narrative or story (Klein et al., 2007).  
The origins of the theory of mental models could lead back all the way to the 
work of Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica (1267) (Klein & Hoffman, 2008). However, 
according to Johnson-Laird (1983), the history of the theory of mental models really 
begins with Kenneth Craik. According to Craik all thinking is a manipulation of internal 
representations of the external world (Craik, 1943). Craik laid the groundwork for future 
theoretical and empirical research on mental models. Many of the first principles of 
mental models identified by Johnson-Laid are attributed to the work of Craik, including: 
the principle of iconicity, the principle of possibilities, and the principle of truth. Some 
have suggested that these and additional principles are what distinguish mental models 
from other types of mental representations such as linguistic structures and semantic 
networks (Johnson-Laird, 2005). In order to unpack what mental models are and how 
they operate a couple of the Johnson-Lairds’ proposed mental model principles will be 
briefly reviewed.  
The first principle is the principle of iconicity. This principle simply states that a 
“mental model has a structure that corresponds to the known structure of what it 
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represents” (Johnson-Laird, 2005, p. 187). The iconic nature of mental models can 
include mental imagery in combination with organized knowledge of concepts and 
relationships (Forrester, 1971; Klein & Hoffman, 2008). The imagistic nature of mental 
models can be used to help explain how a dynamic system operates (Klein & Hoffman, 
2008). If an operator’s mental model did not correspond to the dynamic system, the 
operator would likely not be able to infer the cause and effect relations between the 
different elements of that system. 
The second principle is the principle of strategic variation. This principle simply 
states that “given a class of problems, reasoners develop a variety of strategies from 
exploring manipulations of models” (Johnson-Laird, 2005, p. 191). If we define error 
diagnosis in terms of problem solving, then exploring manipulations to mental models is 
key to an accurate diagnosis. Variation is valuable for providing insight, learning, and 
creativity (Johnson-Laird, 2004). Strategic variation is similar to the elaboration cycle 
within the data/frame model (Kaste, 2012; Klein et al., 2006b; Klein et al., 2007). This 
principle implies that mental models can be dynamic. There is an interaction between the 
nature of the mental model and the task the mental model is supporting.  
Mental models are challenging to define (Klein & Hoffman, 2008). Indeed, it is 
unclear what the correct definition is of mental models. The concept of a ‘mental model’ 
has been defined in a plurality of ways and is similar yet distinct from a number of other 
related concepts such as a frame. However, the principles listed above help distinguish 
mental models from other types of mental representations. It is unclear whether or not the 
principles above will ever be able to be truly falsifiable. However, these principles are 
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congruent with other definitions used by cognitive engineers. Particularly, in terms of 
mental models being: imagistic, dynamic, and mapping onto something in the world 
(Klein & Hoffman, 2008). 
 The principles also illustrate the usefulness and necessity of mental models for many 
vital sensemaking functions such as error detection, diagnoses, and correction in 
intelligent tools. Mental models represent the dynamic relationships and interactions 
between different elements of an intelligent tool, and are used to understand the causal 
relations necessary for error diagnosis  (Klein et al., 2007).  
To summarize, the definition of mental models are internal representations of the 
external world. The structure of the mental model corresponds to the spatial, temporal, 
and causal relations of the elements perceived in the external world by using a 
combination of mental imagery and organized knowledge of concepts and relations. 
Finally, mental models can test hypotheses by running variations of existing mental 
models.  
Mental models play a role in all macrocognitive functions. Particularly, in the 
macrocognitive phenomena sensemaking. Many aspects of error management requires 
various sensemaking operations which rest on the use of mental models. Good error 
management is vital for the future of effective and enduring intelligent tools. Therefore, 
the role of mental models within error management is a valuable place to explore.  
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Error Management of Intelligent Tools 
The focus of the present research is on the role mental models play in complex 
human-machine systems. The modern world is becoming increasingly technologically 
advanced. Utilizing intelligent tools is frequently cheaper, more accurate, and reliable 
compared to human performance alone. However, when intelligent tools are not accurate 
and reliable it can be necessary to detect, diagnose, and correct it. This process is known 
as error management (McBride, Rogers, & Fisk, 2014). Understanding how people 
detect, diagnose, and correct errors is valuable for designers to create more optimized and 
adaptive systems. Unfortunately, despite the vital role of error management within 
complex human-machine systems, error management is still poorly understood (McBride 
et al., 2014). To the extent that operators have an accurate mental model of the intelligent 
tool they are operating they are better equipped to detect, diagnosis, and correct errors in 
the intelligent tool.  
Quality mental models can be useful for error management. However, it should be 
noted that a mental model is not the representation of the intelligent tool itself, rather the 
internal representation that the user has created of that intelligent tool (Moray, 1999; 
Norman, 1983). Therefore, mental models often do not perfectly correspond to what it is 
representing. As a result, mental models are often not complete and inaccurate (Norman, 
1983)4. However, through effective training mental models can be elaborated and 
                                                 
4 See Norman (1983) for full discussion of system mental model challenges. 
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refined; increasing operator performance in detecting, diagnosing, and correcting errors. 
Therefore, analyzing how to effectively train operators to create more accurate mental 
models is valuable.  
Summary  
The vital role mental models play in performance in macrocognitive processes 
makes their evaluation necessary. Empirical evidence of mental models has been limited 
(Klein & Hoffman, 2008). I attempt to help fill this gap. Specifically, I attempt to gather 
evidence for four hypotheses. (1) MMM hypothesis; that performance of one 
sensemaking operation is predictive of performance of another sensemaking operation.  
(2) Through brief instruction and feedback, mental models are developed that involve 
understanding the relational structure between inter-correlated and independent 
feature(s). (3) Understanding of the relational structure of the features can be used to 
make error correction decisions. (4) The strategies that utilize the inter-correlated nature 
of the features can be recognized and verbalized by users.  
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Chapter 3: Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to gather evidence for the first and second 
hypotheses. In order to gather evidence for the second hypothesis, Experiment 1 was 
designed to test learning of using independent differentially weighted features to make 
weather predictions (in the form of probability estimates). Analyzing accuracy of 
probability estimates was used to help infer the quality of participants’ mental models of 
the simulated weather forecasting system. In order to gather evidence for the MMM 
hypothesis, Experiment 1 was also designed to test the relation between participants’ 
probability estimates and evacuation decisions.  
Methods 
Participants. Twenty-four participants were recruited from the Michigan 
Technological University student subject pool. Students participated in the study for 
course credit.  
Materials and Procedure. All experiments were programed and administered 
through the Psychology Experiment Building Language (PEBL) (Mueller & Piper, 2014).  
Similar to the method used by Casteel (2016), participants were asked to imagine 
they were a plant manager during the task. Instructions: “In this task, you are a manager 
who is making decisions about whether to evacuate your facility, which is located on the 
eastern seaboard. There is a hurricane in the Atlantic, and you will need to decide, based 
on National Weather Service (NWS) information, the probability of whether the 
hurricane will come, and whether you should evacuate the facility.” 
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 On each trial participants were given 8 features of differentially weighted 
diagnostic information for the likelihood of a hurricane: wind speed above 74mph, 
rotating winds over the surface of the sea, rising sea level, relative humidity level of 850 
hectopascals, falling pressure, temperature above 80°F, rough choppy sea, and overcast 
skies (see Table 1).5 Each feature, reported by the simulated weather forecasting system, 
either increased or decreased the likelihood of a hurricane. Whether features increased or 
decreased the probability of a hurricane was indicated with the direction of an arrow (see 
Figure 1). For example, if wind was reported, it was either reported as a positive indicator 
with an up arrow and “wind speed above 74mph” or as a negative indicator with a down 
arrow and “wind speed below 74mph”.  
Indicator strength described the influence each feature had on the probability of 
the hurricane. For example, a “very good” indicator increased or decreased the 
probability of a hurricane much more than a feature with an indicator strength reported as 
“poor.” 
 
 
                                                 
5 How these features are related to forecasting in more naturalistic settings was not 
explained. The features were chosen based only on their face validity for being indicators 
of a hurricane. They are not representative of the complex dynamic nature of how 
hurricanes form. Weather forecasting in the real world is much more complex. The 
present research is limited by not analyzing sensemaking operations in naturalistic 
contexts. 
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Table 1 Materials used for Experiments: Features and their Weights 
 
Feature 
Number 
Features of Information Indicator Strength 
F1 Wind speed above 74mph Very good 
F2 Rotating winds over the surface 
of the sea 
Very good 
F3 Rising sea level Good 
F4 Relative humidity level of 850 
Hectopascals 
Fair 
F5 Falling Pressures Fair 
F6 Temperature above 80°F Poor 
F7 Rough choppy sea Very poor 
F8 Overcast Skies Not an indicator at all 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of typical message shown to participants on each trial. 
Participants started with 10 practice trials. A 90(83) taguchi factorial design was 
used, meaning participants completed ninety trials with eight features that had three 
levels (positive, negative, absent) per feature. Using a taguchi design ensured that there 
was a unique feature set on each trial and that every possible combination of features was 
shown at least once. 
Based on information provided by the weighted features, participants rated the 
likelihood of a hurricane from 0% to 100% on a thermometer in the upper right corner of 
their screen (see Figure 2). After estimating the probability of a hurricane, participants 
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indicated whether they should evacuate or stay. They were told they should evacuate if 
there was a high probability of a hurricane, however, that if a hurricane does not hit it 
would unnecessarily cost the company money and job performance would suffer.  
 
Figure 2: Likelihood assessment scale for the probability of a hurricane. 
After participants made their two judgments (probability estimate and evacuation 
decision), both verbal and audio feedback was provided. A box was shown with a 15% 
range around the true estimate for the probability of a hurricane based on the weights of 
the features shown (see Table 2 for statistical model indicator strength)6. A beep would 
also sound if participants were within the range estimate. If correct, participants were 
                                                 
6 The statistical model used is a simple linear model and is not representative of the real-
world dynamic nature of weather. Models used in weather forecasting in more 
naturalistic settings are dynamic and therefore much more complex.  
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given a score of 100 points. After participants reviewed the feedback, they clicked either 
a “Good estimate. Click to continue” button or “Try to improve. Click to continue” 
button. The timing of each trial, which features were present, participants probability 
estimate of the likelihood of a hurricane, the model probability estimate of a hurricane 
(i.e. the true probability estimate), and participants evacuation decisions were recorded.  
Table 2: Feature weight values used for statistical model. 
Feature Number Statistical model 
Indicator Strength 
F1 .8 
F2 .8 
F3 .6 
F4 .5 
F5 .5 
F6 .2 
F7 .1 
F8 .01 
 
Results & Discussion 
In order to help ensure data quality, each participants’ accuracy was compared to 
what would be achieved only by chance. Accuracy was calculated by the number of times 
participants made probability estimates within the 15% band of the hidden statistical 
model probability estimate. No participant scored at or lower than chance. Accuracy 
ranged between 23% - 55% (M = .25, SD = .43), suggesting participants took the 
Experiment seriously and did not simply click through.  
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The features that were utilized by participants were analyzed. To reduce bias from 
non-linear data, a logodds transformation was conducted on participants’ probability 
estimates. A multiple linear regression was performed to predict participants’ probability 
estimates based on each of the features. Each feature was treated as an independent 
variable within the model. Results are shown in Table 3. Table 2 shows the weights of 
each feature for the hidden model probability estimate of a hurricane. Results suggest that 
almost all of the features significantly predict participants’ probability estimates. 
Participants are likely not, therefore, utilizing the take the best heuristic (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). Indeed, of the eight differentially weighted features the only feature not 
a statistically significant predictor of participants’ responses was the feature that 
participants were told was not an indicator (i.e. the only irrelevant feature). Consistent 
with hypothesis 2 this suggests participants created a mental model that contained the 
relational structure of all eight features when making probability estimates. 
Table 3. Experiment 1 multiple linear regression 
Variable B SE B t p 
F1 .70 .03 23.78 <.01 
F2 .56 .03 18.82 <.01 
F3 .33 .03 11.31 <.01 
F4 .27 .03 9.24 <.01 
F5 .21 .03 7.05 .01 
F6 .15 .03 4.99 <.01 
F7 .07 .03 2.37 .02 
F8 -.04 .03 -1.29 .20 
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In order to evaluate the relations of evacuation decision and probability estimates, 
a correlation was calculated, r =.81, N = 24, p <.01. The evacuation decision was 
aggregated according to the average evacuation decision for all participants on each trial. 
Consistent with hypothesis 1, results suggest that participants’ evacuation decisions were 
closely related to their probability estimates. In other words if participants indicated a 
high probability of a hurricane they were more likely to make the decision to evacuate.  
In summary, Experiment 1 suggested through brief instruction, visual feedback, 
and audio feedback that participants created a mental model of the system which related 
all eight differentially weighted features to the probability estimates consistent with the 
second hypothesis. This result provides some support for hypothesis 2. The strong 
correlation between participants’ probability estimates and evacuation decisions suggests 
that the same knowledge (or mental model) used to make the probability estimates was 
also used make the evacuation decisions consistent with the MMM hypothesis. The result 
suggests participants are basing their evacuation decisions on their estimations by 
weighing a number of differentially weighted features into a probability estimate which 
suggests on a linear scale whether a hurricane is coming or not. However, how would an 
inaccurate and unreliable weather forecasting system influence participants’ mental 
models? In more naturalistic settings of weather forecasting systems are not always 
entirely accurate (Berger, 2017). One notable example is when the Global Forecasting 
System (GFS) inaccurately predicted hurricane Sandys’ day of landfall. An important 
aspect of error management is determining where an error could come from. Is the error a 
human error or a technological error? Accurately answering this question likely 
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influences how a user decides when to use or not use a system. Therefore, it is valuable to 
analyze error detection and error correction sensemaking operations.  
Chapter 4: Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 suggested that through feedback, participants learned to weigh 
independent and differentially weighted features to make probability estimates consistent 
with hypothesis 2. Some evidence was also gathered for the MMM hypothesis; 
evacuation decisions were closely related to probability estimates. Experiment 2 was 
designed to extend testing for other vital sensemaking operations. There were two vital 
operations experiment 2 was designed to gather data for. (1) Experiment 2 was designed 
to test for participants’ ability to make a judgements about the source of an error (either 
themselves or the simulated forecasting system). (2) Experiment 2 was designed to test 
for participants’ ability to correct an error in the feature report of the simulated weather 
forecasting system.  
Methods 
Participants. Data from seventeen participants were collected from Michigan 
Technological University student subject pool (N = 17). Students participated in the study 
for course credit. 
Materials and Procedure. Materials and Procedures were similar to Experiment 
1. However, the evacuation decision was removed and participants were told that there 
were some malfunctions in the “weather forecasting system’s sensor report”. They were 
told that the simulated weather forecasting system may report a false feature (i.e., a 
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positively indicated feature is actually a negatively indicated feature). Each trial 
presented all eight features. There were ten practice trials and seventy non-practice trials.  
Half of the trials were error trials, meaning that inaccurate information was 
reported. If participants were accurate on a non-error trial, participants were given a 
score of 100 and moved on to the next trial. If participants were inaccurate on a non-
error trial they were shown visual feedback with the 15% red band around the true 
estimate. Participants were asked to click either the “I was wrong” or “System 
malfunction” button. Regardless of the button they clicked they were told they were in 
fact wrong, and instructed to click the “ok” button to start a new trial. 
If participants were accurate on an error trial, they were told their estimate was 
wrong and shown the visual feedback with the 15% red band around the true estimate. 
Participants were asked to click either the “I was wrong” or “System malfunction” 
button. Participants were then informed that the “weather forecasting system” had 
malfunctioned. Participants were then asked to select where the error had occurred by 
choosing which features were incorrect. Participants could choose one or all features but 
had to choose at least one feature before clicking the “ok” button, and then move on to 
the next trial. The timing of each trial, which features presented, participants probability 
estimate, the model probability estimate, blame choice, and which features selected to 
correct the system fault were all recorded.  
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Results and Discussion 
Similar to Experiment 1, accuracy of probability estimates were compared to 
accuracy that would be achieved only by chance. No participants scored at or lower than 
chance. Accuracy ranged between 19% - 66% (M = .34, SD = .47).  
The relations between average accuracy by participant in probability estimates 
and blame attribution across three different conditions (system correct human error, 
system incorrect human error, and system incorrect human correct) was analyzed. First 
the relation between average accuracy by participant and blame attribution on trials when 
the system was correct but participants made incorrect probability estimates was analyzed 
r = -.03, p > .05 (see Figure 3). This result suggests that there are no differences in blame 
attributions on the system correct human error condition based on probability estimate 
performance. This suggests that regardless of ability levels (or how good participants’ 
mental models are) participants on this condition accurately blamed themselves.  
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Figure 3: Relationship between average accuracy by participant and likelihood to blame 
themselves when the system was correct and participants made an error.  
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Figure 4: Relationship between average accuracy by participant and likelihood to blame 
themselves when the system was incorrect and participants made an error.  
 
There was a large correlation between average accuracy by participant and blame 
attribution on trials when the system was incorrect and participants made an error r = -
.75, p < .01 (see Figure 4). This result suggests that participants who generally perform 
better are less likely to blame themselves. In this condition there is no incorrect blame 
attribution, however, the result suggests that participants who have a better mental model 
of the system (as suggested by their probability estimate performance) are likely aware 
they have a good mental model of the system, compared to participants who have a 
poorer mental model.  
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Figure 5: Relationship between average accuracy by participant and likelihood to 
blame themselves when the system was incorrect and participants made an error.  
 
There was a large correlation between average accuracy by participant and blame 
attribution on trials when the system was incorrect and participants were correct in their 
probability estimates r = -.70, p < .01 (see Figure 5). Consistent with the previous result, 
this result suggests that participants who generally perform better are less likely to blame 
themselves. If participants generally perform worse this result suggests that they are 
likely aware of it, therefore, tend to blame themselves even when they are correct.  
An overall correlation was performed between average accuracy by participant for 
detecting where the error occurred (i.e. blame attributions) and average accuracy by 
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participant for making probability estimates, which was a strong and statistically 
significant relation r = .9, p < .01. This result is consistent with the MMM hypothesis. 
 Average accuracy for correcting probability estimates by adjusting the direction 
of the sensor features ranged between 57% - 100% (M = .83, SD = .48). A correlation 
was performed between average accuracy by participant when making the initial 
probability estimates and average accuracy by participant for correcting the probability 
estimates r = -.68, p < .01. This results is not consistent with the MMM hypothesis.  
 Some of the results from Experiment 2 were consistent with the MMM 
hypothesis. Participants’ accuracy at probability estimation was strongly associated with 
participants’ ability to make accurate blame attributions. Results also suggested that 
participants who had a better mental model of the system (i.e. were more accurate in their 
probability estimates) made blame attributions that suggested they knew they had a good 
mental model of the system. While participants who had a poorer mental model of the 
system were more likely to blame themselves. However, other results did not support the 
MMM hypothesis. This suggests that the mental model created with initial learning 
through feedback while making weather predictions may not transfer to all sensemaking 
operations tested. Experiment 3 was designed to be a replication study of Experiment 2. 
Experiment 3 differed only by providing further error diagnosis feedback.  
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Chapter 5: Experiment 3 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, Experiment 2 suggested that participants’ 
accuracy at probability estimation was strongly associated with participants’ ability to 
make accurate blame attributions. The goal of Experiment 3 was to replicate results from 
Experiment 2. The only difference between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 was 
additional feature specific error diagnosis feedback.  
Method 
Participants. Data from twenty-seven participants were collected from the 
Michigan Technological University student subject pool. Students participated in the 
study for course credit. One participant’s data were removed for not completing the 
experiment.  
Materials and Procedure. Materials and Procedures were similar to that of 
Experiment 2. However, contrary to Experiment 2 after participants chose which features 
were inaccurately reported they were provided with visual feedback if they chose the 
correct features. The timing of each trial, which features presented, participants 
probability estimate, the model probability estimate, blame choice, and which features 
selected to correct the system fault were all recorded. 
Results and Discussion 
Similar to Experiments 1-2 average accuracy by participant was analyzed. No 
participant scored at or lower than chance. Accuracy ranged between 20% - 61% (M = 
.34, SD = .48).  
MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION  33 
 
Results were very similar to Experiment 2. The relation between average accuracy 
by participant and blame attribution on trials when the system was correct but 
participants made incorrect probability estimates was analyzed r = .07, p > .05. This 
result suggests that there are no differences in blame attributions on the system correct 
human error condition. There was a medium sized correlation between average accuracy 
by participant and blame attribution on trials when the system was incorrect and 
participants made an error r = -.49, p < .01. This result suggests that participants who 
generally perform better are less likely to blame themselves. There was a medium sized 
correlation between average accuracy by participant and blame attribution on trials when 
the system was incorrect and participants were correct in their probability estimates r = -
.51, p < .01. This result also suggests that participants who generally perform better are 
less likely to blame themselves.  
A correlation was performed across trials between average accuracy by 
participant for detecting where the error occurred and average accuracy by participant for 
making probability estimates was statistically significant r = .92, p < .01. 
 Average accuracy for correcting probability estimates by adjusting the direction 
of the sensor features ranged between 48% - 93% (M = .57, SD = .49). A correlation was 
performed between average accuracy by participant when making the initial probability 
estimates and average accuracy by participant for correcting the probability estimates r = 
-.33, n = 27, p > .05. Results are not consistent with the MMM hypothesis.  
 Results from Experiment 3 largely replicated results from Experiment 2. 
Experiments 4a-4b were designed to test for further valuable sensemaking operations. 
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Particularly, Experiments 4a-4b were designed to test for learning the relations between 
inter-correlated features as depicted in the example from Chapter 1. Research has been 
conducted on the use of negatively correlated features in decision making (Fasolo, 
McClelland, & Todd, 2007). However, understanding of inter-correlated features for the 
use of accomplishing complex goals has been relatively unexplored. Using inter-
correlated features to make probability estimates are more closely related to how people 
make judgments and predictions across a variety of situations—including weather 
forecasting. Accurate use of inter-correlated features to make probability estimates, error 
detections, and error corrections requires unique mental arithmetic compared to 
independent features alone. Therefore, it is valuable to explore. 
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Chapter 6: Experiment 4a 
 Experiments 4a-4b are extensions of Experiments 1-3. Experiment 1 suggested 
that through feedback, participants learned to weigh independent and differentially 
weighted features to make weather predications. Some evidence was also gathered for the 
MMM hypothesis; evacuation decisions were closely related to probability estimates. 
Experiments 2-3 provided evidence that supports the notion that participants recognize 
how accurate their mental models are of the simulated weather forecasting system. 
Experiment 4a is designed to test whether participants can make probability estimates, 
detect errors, and correct errors by using inter-correlated features. Experiment 4a and 4b 
differ in two ways. The first difference was in how the hidden statistical model created 
the “true” probability estimates. In both Experiment 4a and 4b the first three features are 
inter-correlated with a correlation of .9. In Experiment 4a the weights of the first three 
features were added together to make the probability estimate. In Experiment 4b the 
value that appeared most often of the three inter-correlated feature was weighted and 
incorporated into the probability estimate. For example, if two of the three features were 
negative indicators and the third was a positive indicator (-1,-1, 1) the mode of the three 
features was incorporated into the model (-1). The second way the two Experiments 
differed was in Experiment 4b the shown probability estimate was removed from the 
screen when the error detection in the sensor report questions were asked. 
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Methods  
Participants. Data from twenty-six participants were collected from the Michigan 
Technological University student subject pool. See Table 4 for basic demographic 
information.  
Table 4: Demographics for Experiments 4a and 4b 
  Experiment 4a Experiment 4b 
Age  M = 19.62 SD = 1.63 
range 18-24  
M = 20.16 SD = 177 
range 18-23 
Gender  54% (N = 14) Male 52% (N = 13) Male 
Ethnicity    
 Caucasian 92% (N = 24)  80% (N = 20) 
 Asian 8% (N = 2) 12% (N = 3) 
 Black 0% (N = 0) 4%(N = 1) 
 Hispanic 0% (N = 0) 4%(N = 1) 
 
Materials and Procedure. Materials and procedure were similar to Experiments 
1-3, with a few notable differences. In this task, simulated data was reported from a 
simulated weather forecasting system. In order to gather some ecologically validity, 
features utilized in this task were based on features from the actual Global Forecasting 
System (GFS) model ((NOAA), 2018). The real GFS is a model which combines data 
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from four separate sub-models: atmosphere, ocean, land/soil, and sea/ice. Five features 
were chosen from the GFS model: long waves, high waves, rotating winds over the 
surface of the sea, soil moisture 40-100 cm below the surface, and 50% cloud cover. 
Features were chosen based solely off of their face validity. The first three features were 
chosen from the ocean sub model, which would be the inter-correlated features. The 
independent feature (soil moisture) was chosen from the land/soil sub model. Finally, the 
last independent feature (50% cloud cover) was chosen from the atmospheric sub model. 
The first three features were inter-correlated with a correlation of .9. Meaning 
during the practice trials the features reported information consistent with each other 
approximately 90% of the time. The two independent features had a correlation of less 
than .1 with the first three inter-correlated features and with each other.  
Participants were given 40 practice trials with visual and audio feedback. Practice 
trials did not include error trials. Practice trials were designed for participants to gain a 
mental model of how the simulated weather forecasting system operated through 
instruction and feedback while making probability estimates by using inter-correlated and 
independent differentially weighted features. Participants’ accuracy in making probability 
estimates was considered to be an empirical measure of how accurate participants’ mental 
models were of the system.  
Participants also responded to 96 error detection trials. During the error detection 
trials participants did not make probability estimates. In contrast, on each trial 
participants were shown a list of both inter-correlated and independent features (see 
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Table 5). The first three feature, because they were inter-correlated, were listed as having 
very good indicator strength when reported together.  
Half of the 96 trials contained an error. An error occurred when one or more 
feature(s) were incorrectly reported, or when the simulated system calculation incorrectly 
calculated an estimate based on the features displayed, or both the features and the 
calculation was incorrect. On each trial participants were asked two questions. “Do you 
think there is an error in the sensors above?” “Suppose the sensors are correct, is there an 
error in the probability estimate?” Participants were asked to click on the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
buttons on each trial.  
Participants were provided with feedback from a hypothetical forecasting system 
named after the actual “European Forecasting System” (EFS). The EFS reported if the 
simulated system did make an error in the sensor report. After clicking the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
button(s) participants were shown a new page with the features and probability estimates. 
Similar to previous experiments, participants were asked to choose any incorrectly 
reported features.  
If the probability estimates were incorrect participants were asked to provide the 
accurate probability estimate. Similar to previous experiments visual feedback was 
displayed with a 15% red band around the true statistical model probability estimate.  
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 Table 5: Materials for the proposed Experiment. 
Cues of Information Indicator Strength 
Long waves  
High waves Very Good 
Rotating winds over 
the surface of the sea 
 
Soil moisture 40-100 
cm below surface 
Very Good 
50% cloud cover Fair 
 
 Immediately after completing the 70 error detection trials some post-hoc 
questions were asked (see Appendix A for post-hoc questions). Data from nineteen 
participants was gathered to assess their knowledge and computations for sensor error 
detection. Results were coded according to their sensitivity to the inter-correlated and 
independence of the features. After responding to the post-hoc questions, participants 
were asked to explain their thought process while responding to five different trials they 
had previously responded to. These examples consisted of both inter-correlated and 
independent features in the sensor report, in order to assess sensitivity to the independent 
and inter-correlated features. 
Results & Discussion 
 
 For the practice trials, no participants scored at or lower than chance. 
Participants accuracy in their probability estimates made during the practice trials ranged 
between 33% - 68% (M = .49, SD = .5).  
Based on data collected for empirical analyses alone, it is unclear how previous 
knowledge of a hurricane influences responses on these tasks. Therefore, the qualitative 
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data was analyzed to determine how previous knowledge of hurricanes and weather 
forecasting influenced responses on the tasks. Based on the assessment of the qualitative 
data, only three of the twenty three participants reported using their previous knowledge 
of hurricanes to make sensor error report decisions. The vast majority reported using 
feedback from the weather system to learn how to make correct error detection decisions 
and probability estimates.  
Half of the ninety-six error trials had an error in the sensor report, as produced by 
the “Global Forecasting System.” Accuracy for detecting an error in the sensor report 
ranged between 52% - 97% (M = .68, SD = .15). In order to accurately detect an error in 
the sensor report participants would need to incorporate the relational structure of the 
inter-correlated and independent features. Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants would 
incorporate the relational structure of the inter-correlated features. In order to test for 
sensitivity to feature correlations, first, a general linear model was conducted to compare 
the effect of (IV’s) condition type on (DV) sensor error detection accuracy (See Table 6 
for the different condition types). A chi-square analysis of deviance was performed on the 
model to test if the conditions explained variability in sensor error detection response 
more than chance χ2 = 369.95, df = 4, p < .01. Results suggest that condition type (as 
identified by Table 6) does influence sensor error detection responses. Based off of these 
results further analyses were conducted. A paired samples t-test was performed to test 
whether there was a statistically significant difference in error detection responses 
between independent feature inconsistent and inter-correlated feature inconsistent 
conditions. There was a significant difference in responses between when the 
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independent feature was inconsistent (M = .59, SD = .25) and when the inter-correlated 
feature was inconsistent (M = .37, SD = .21); t(25) = 3.15, p < .01. (A higher average 
indicates more “no error” responses to sensor error detection question.) Consistent with 
hypothesis 2, this result suggests that participants were sensitive to and understood the 
relational structure of the inter-correlated features.  
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Table 6: conditions to test for sensitivity to feature correlations 
Condition Example Number 
of Trials 
1 Features all the 
same 
 
 
 
 
Same plus missing 
feature  
↑Long Waves, ↑ High Waves, ↑ 
Rotating Winds, ↑ Soil Moisture 40-100 
cm below surface; ↓ Short Waves, ↓ 
Low Waves, ↓ Consistent Winds, ↓ Soil 
Moisture 10 cm below surface 
↑High Waves, ↑ Rotating Winds, ↑Soil 
Moisture 40-100 cm below surface 
24 
2 Independent feature 
is inconsistent 
 
 
 
 
Independent feature 
inconsistent plus 
correlated feature 
missing 
↑ Long Waves,  ↑ High Waves,        
↑Rotating Winds, ↓ Soil Moisture 10 cm 
below surface; ↓ Short Waves, ↓ Low 
Waves, ↓ Consistent Winds, ↑Soil 
Moisture 40-100 cm below surface 
 
↑ High Waves, ↑Rotating Winds, ↓ Soil 
Moisture 10 cm below surface; ↓ Low 
Waves, ↓ Consistent Winds, ↑Soil 
Moisture 40-100 cm below surface 
24 
3 1 inter correlated 
feature is inconsistent 
 
one correlated feature 
inconsistent plus 
independent variable 
missing 
↓ Short Waves, ↑ High Waves, ↑ 
Rotating Winds, ↑ Soil Moisture 40-100 
cm below surface 
 
↓ Short Waves, ↑ High Waves, ↑ 
Rotating Winds 
18 
4 1 independent and 1 
correlated feature the 
same but 1 correlated 
feature inconsistent  
 
Independent and 1 
correlated feature the 
same but one 
correlated feature 
missing 
↓ Short Waves, ↑ High Waves, ↑ 
Rotating Winds, ↓ Soil Moisture 10 cm 
below surface 
 
↑ High Waves, ↓ Consistent Winds, ↑ 
Soil Moisture 40-100 cm below surface 
 
30 
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To the extent that participants responded differently to the independent feature 
inconsistent condition and the inter-correlated feature inconsistent condition then they are 
correctly incorporating the inter-correlated feature into their error detection decisions. In 
order to help test hypothesis 1, the difference between responses to condition 2 and 
condition 3 for each participant and the relation on performance when making probability 
estimates during the practice trials was calculated, r = .1, p >.05. Results were 
inconsistent with MMM hypothesis.  
In condition 1 there is no error in the sensor report; all of the features are 
consistent. In condition 2 there is also no error in the sensor report; only the independent 
feature is inconsistent. Therefore, there should be no difference in error detection 
responses between conditions 1 and 2. If there is a difference in responses it suggests 
participants are incorrectly incorporating the irrelevant piece of information to make their 
error detection decisions. In order to test whether participants were incorporating the 
inconsistency of the independent feature into their error detection decision responses to 
condition 1 and condition 2 were compared. A paired sample t-test showed a statistically 
significant difference between condition 1 responses (M = .75, SD = .12) and condition 2 
responses (M = .59, SD = .25) t(25)=3.28, p < .01.  
In condition 3 there is an error in the sensor report; one of the inter-correlated 
features is inconsistent with another inter-correlated feature(s). In condition 4 there is 
also an error in the sensor report, however, in addition to one of the inter-correlated 
features being inconsistent the independent feature is also inconsistent. If participants are 
not inaccurately incorporating irrelevant information into their error detection decisions 
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then there should be little to no difference between responses to condition 3 and condition 
4. In order to test whether participants inaccurately incorporated the irrelevant piece of 
information into their error detection decisions responses to condition 3 and condition 4 
were compared. A paired sample t-test showed a statistically significant difference 
between responses to condition 3 (M = .37, SD = .21) and condition 4 (M = .28, SD = 
.16); t(25) = 3.5, p < .01. This suggests once again that participants are incorporating the 
irrelevant piece of information and that their mental models of the “GFS” system does 
not accurately represent the independence of the feature.  
The relationship between performance during the practice trials and participants’ 
ability to detect an error in the sensor report was analyzed. There was a medium sized 
correlation between the average for each participant during the practice trials and the 
average for each participant for detecting an error in the sensor report, r = .4, p <.05. 
Suggesting the knowledge of the system during the practice trials was related to the 
knowledge used to detect an error in the sensor report.  
To the extent that there is a difference in responses between conditions 1 and 2 
then participants are inaccurately incorporating the independent feature into their error 
detection decisions. A correlation was performed to determine if performance during the 
practice trials while making probability estimates predicted participants’ likelihood to not 
incorporate the irrelevant piece of information. Inconsistent with hypothesis 1, 
participants performance when making probability estimates did not predict likelihood of 
incorporating the irrelevant piece of information, r = -.1, p >.05. 
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Hypothesis 4 suggested that participants would be able to recognize their 
strategies for detecting errors. Data from nineteen participants was gathered to assess 
their strategies at detecting an error in the sensor report. Across the seven post-hoc 
interview questions approximately half of the participants did not report using the inter-
correlated nature of the features to detect an error in the sensor report (N = 10) (see 
Appendix B for example responses). In contrast, participants reported using 
inconsistencies between the feature weights and the GFS systems’ probability estimates. 
In order to test hypothesis 4 (that strategies could be recognized) a correlation was 
performed between the total score from each qualitative question and average sensor 
error detection accuracy by participant. There was a statistically significant relation 
between error detection accuracy and qualitative score r = .53, p < .05. This result may be 
from an insufficient amount of qualitative data. It could be the case that participants’ used 
two strategies to detect an error in the system report and only reported one. As will be 
described in later results participants who made incorrect error detection judgments still 
made corrections consistent with the inter-correlation. This may suggest that participants 
used different knowledge to detect an error compared to correcting the error, or that they 
may have used diverse strategies. However, the only strategies reported in the present 
qualitative assessment was using either the comparison of the feature weights to the 
probability estimates or using the feature inter-correlation. No participants reported using 
both.  
Further analyses were conducted to test for the sensitivity to feature correlation by 
analyzing which features were chosen to correct the error(s) in the sensor report. In other 
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words, which features participants chose to correct. A feature was reported incorrectly 
when it reported incongruent information with another inter-correlated feature. For 
example, when one inter-correlated feature was a positive indicator of a hurricane and 
another inter-correlated feature was a negative indicator of a hurricane.  
To help test hypothesis 2 and 3, two binomial tests were performed. The first 
compared the proportion of correct changes consistent with the feature correlation when 
there was no error in the sensor report and participants incorrectly detected an error. The 
second, tested the comparison on trials where an error was present (i.e. feature(s) were 
inconsistent). The first binomial test for the no error present trials, indicated that the 
proportion of instances where participants made changes that were consistent with the 
feature correlation of .58 was higher than the expected .5, p < .01. The second binomial 
test for the error present trials, indicated that the proportion of instances where 
participants made changes that were consistent with the feature correlation of .59 was 
higher than the expected .5, p < .01. Results suggest that participants made changes 
consistent with the feature correlation even when participants inaccurately indicated there 
was an error in the sensor report. This result is consistent with hypothesis 2 and 3.  
 Once again hypothesis 1 was tested to determine if performance when making 
probability estimates predicted performance at correcting errors in the sensor report. A 
correlation was performed between the average accuracy of sensor error correction by 
subject and performance during the practice trials r = -.12, p > .05. There was not a 
statistically significant correlation between performance for sensor error correction and 
performance during the practice trials.  
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 Half of the ninety-six error trials had an error in the shown probability estimate, 
as produced by the “Global Forecasting System.” Participants accuracy in detecting the 
error in the probability estimate ranged between 61% - 95% (M = .8, SD = .4). A Pearson 
correlation was performed between the average accuracy by participant during the 
practice trials and the average accuracy for detecting an error in the probability estimate 
during the error detection trials, r = .4, p < .05. Results suggest that participants’ 
understanding (or mental model) of the simulated weather forecasting system, gained 
during the practice trials, was associated with their ability to detect an error in the 
probability estimates during the error detection trials.  
 The accuracy for participants correcting the probability estimate ranged 
between 60% - 92% (M = .77, SD = .42). A Pearson correlation was also performed 
between the average accuracy by participant during the practice trials and the average 
accuracy for correcting the probability estimate during the error detection trials, r = .65, p 
< .01. Results are consistent with the multi-function mental model hypothesis.  
 There was a statistically significant relationship between participants ability to 
accurately detect an error in the probability estimate and their ability to correct the error 
in the probability estimate, r = .59, p < .01. Suggesting that if participants are able to 
accurately detect the error they will also be likely to correct the error. However, even 
when some participants some of the time inaccurately detect an error they still may be 
able to correct it.   
 Results from Experiment 4a supported the MMM hypothesis. Many of the error 
detection and correction decisions and judgements had a statistically significant relation 
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with participants’ performance when making probability estimates. Results also 
supported the second hypothesis; error detection decisions were consistent with 
understanding the relational structure of the inter-correlated features. Results also 
supported the third hypothesis; error correction decisions were consistent with the inter-
correlated nature of the features. Finally, results also supported the fourth hypothesis; 
reported strategies had a statistically significant relation to accurate error detection 
decisions in the sensor report. Experiment 4b was designed to replicate results from 
Experiment 4a. Experiment 4b differed in two ways. (1) The first was the way the hidden 
statistical model weighed the inter-correlated features. (2) Because a number of 
participants’ reported using the inconsistencies between feature weights and the GFS 
systems reported probability estimates as their strategy for detecting an error in the sensor 
report the reported probability estimate was not shown on the same screen when 
participants were asked sensor error detection questions.  
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Chapter 7: Experiment 4b  
  Experiment 4b was designed to replicate results from Experiment 4a. There were 
two differences between Experiment 4a and 4b. The first was in how the hidden 
statistical model weighed the inter-correlated features. In Experiment 4a the weights of 
the first three features were added together to make the probability estimate. In 
Experiment 4b the value that appeared most often of the three inter-correlated feature was 
weighted and incorporated into the probability estimate. For example, if two of the three 
features were negative indicators (-1,-1) and the third was a positive indicator (1) the 
mode of the three features was incorporated into the model (-1). Weighing the inter-
correlated features in this way is more consistent with how probability estimates work 
with inter-correlated features in more naturalistic environments. The second way 
Experiment 4b differed was in how participants’ were presented with the error detection 
question in the sensor report. In Experiment 4a participants’ were shown the probability 
estimate and the sensor error detection question on the same screen. Qualitative analyses 
suggested a number of participants’ used inconsistencies between feature weights and the 
GFS systems reported probability estimates as their strategy for detecting an error in the 
sensor report. Therefore, error detection questions were not displayed on the same screen. 
Participants would first respond to the sensor report error detection question and only 
after responding were they shown the probability estimate.  
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Methods  
Participants. Twenty-six participants were collected from the Michigan 
Technological University student subject pool. Demographics are reported in Table 4.  
Materials and Procedure. Materials and procedure were the same as those 
reported in Experiment 4a.  
Results and Discussion 
 
 For the practice trials, no participants scored at or lower than chance. Accuracy 
ranged between 22% - 67% (M = .43, SD = .49).  
 Accuracy for detecting an error in the sensor report ranged between 52% - 94% 
(M = .71, SD = .45). In order to test for sensitivity to feature correlations a general 
linear model was performed to compare the effect of (IV’s) condition type on (DV) 
sensor error detection accuracy (See Table 6 for the different condition types). A chi-
square analysis of deviance was performed on the model to test if the conditions 
explained variability in sensor error detection response more than chance χ2 = 60.60, df = 
4, p < .01. Results suggest that condition type (as identified by Table 6) does influence 
sensor error detection responses. Therefore, further analyses were conducted to test for 
sensitivity to the inter-correlated nature of the features when making error detection 
decisions. A paired samples t-test was conducted to test whether there was a statistically 
significant difference in error detection responses between independent feature 
inconsistent and inter-correlated feature inconsistent conditions. Results were similar to 
Experiment 4a, there was a significant difference in responses between when the 
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independent feature was inconsistent (M = .62, SD = .34) and when the inter-correlated 
feature was inconsistent (M = .34, SD = .33); t(24) = 2.94, p < .01. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, this result suggests that participants were sensitive to and understood the 
relational structure of the inter-correlated features. 
 To the extent that participants responded differently to the independent feature 
inconsistent (condition 2) and the inter-correlated feature inconsistent (condition 3) then 
they are correctly incorporating the inter-correlated feature into their error detection 
decisions. In order to help test hypothesis 1, the difference between responses to 
condition 2 and condition 3 for each participant and the relation on performance when 
making probability estimates during the practice trials was calculated, r = .44, p <.05. 
Results were inconsistent with hypothesis 1. 
In condition 1 there is no error in the sensor report; all of the features are 
consistent. In condition 2 there is also no error in the sensor report; only the independent 
feature is inconsistent. Therefore, there should be no difference in error detection 
responses between conditions 1 and 2. If there is a difference in responses it suggests 
participants are incorrectly incorporating the irrelevant piece of information to make their 
error detection decisions. In order to test whether participants were incorporating the 
inconsistency of the independent feature into their error detection decision responses to 
condition 1 and condition 2 were compared. A paired sample t-test showed a statistically 
significant difference between condition 1 responses (M = .92, SD = .11) and condition 2 
responses (M = .62, SD = .34) t(24)=4.43, p < .01.  
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In condition 3 there is an error in the sensor report; one of the inter-correlated 
features is inconsistent with another inter-correlated feature(s). In condition 4 there is 
also an error in the sensor report, however, in addition to one of the inter-correlated 
features being inconsistent the independent feature is also inconsistent. If participants are 
not inaccurately incorporating irrelevant information into their error detection decisions 
then there should be little to no difference between responses to condition 3 and condition 
4. In order to test whether participants inaccurately incorporated the irrelevant piece of 
information into their error detection decisions responses to condition 3 and condition 4 
were compared. A paired sample t-test showed a statistically significant difference 
between responses to condition 3 (M = .35, SD = .33) and condition 4 (M = .37, SD = 
.30); t(24) = -0.59, p > .01. This suggests that the independent feature does not influence 
error detection responses when an error is present.  
To the extent that there is a difference in responses between conditions 1 and 2 
then participants are inaccurately incorporating the independent feature into their error 
detection decisions. A correlation was performed to determine if performance during the 
practice trials while making probability estimates predicted participants’ likelihood to not 
incorporate the irrelevant piece of information. Inconsistent with hypothesis 1, 
participants performance when making probability estimates did not predict likelihood of 
incorporating the irrelevant piece of information, r = -.22, p >.05. 
 The relationship between performance during the practice trials and participants’ 
ability to detect an error in the sensor report was analyzed. There was a medium sized 
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correlation between the average for each participant during the practice trials and the 
average for each participant for detecting an error in the sensor report, r = .49, p <.05.  
 Results suggest participants are sensitive to the inter-correlated nature of the 
features. In order to help test hypothesis 4 which suggests participants are able to 
recognize their strategies for detecting errors qualitative data was analyzed. Seven post-
hoc interview questions were asked (see appendix A for post-hoc questions). All of the 
participants interviewed (N = 11) provided responses consistent with understanding the 
inter-correlation between the features. Since all participants reported using the inter-
correlated nature of the features to make their error detection responses the relation 
between strategies used to detect an error in the sensor report and performance when 
making probability estimates during the practice trials could not be analyzed. However, 
overall performance at detecting error in the sensor report is higher for experiment 4a 
compared to 4b which is consistent with the results reflected in the qualitative 
assessment. In contrast to Experiment 4a, more participants also reported using only the 
inconsistency between the first three inter-correlated features, which is consistent with 
the hidden statistical model. In Experiment 4a many participants reported using a 
majority rules strategy, regardless of whether the feature was independent or not. 
However, across both experiments participants reported using the independent feature as 
a tie breaker for choosing which inter-correlated feature was reported incorrectly.  
 Further analyses were conducted to test for the sensitivity to feature correlation by 
analyzing which features were chosen to correct the error(s) in the sensor report. In other 
words which features participants chose to correct. Two binomial tests were performed, 
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one for comparing the proportion of correct changes consistent with the feature 
correlation when there was no error in the sensor report and participants incorrectly 
detected an error and the second one for testing the comparison of the same proportion 
but on trials where an error was present (i.e. feature(s) were inconsistent). The first 
binomial test for the no error present trials, indicated that the proportion of instances 
where participants made changes that were consistent with the feature correlation of .81 
was higher than the expected .5, p < .01. The second binomial test for the error present 
trials, indicated that the proportion of instances where participants made changes that 
were consistent with the feature correlation of .83 was higher than the expected .5, p < 
.01. Results suggest that participants made changes consistent with the feature correlation 
even when participants inaccurately indicated there was an error in the sensor report 
when there was none.  
 A correlation was performed between the average accuracy of sensor error 
correction by subject and performance during the practice trials r =.26, p > .05. There 
was not a statistically significant correlation between performance for sensor error 
correction and performance during the practice trials.   
 Participants accuracy in detecting the error in the probability estimate ranged 
between 44% - 99% (M = .71, SD = .45). A Pearson correlation was performed between 
the average accuracy by participant during the practice trials and the average accuracy for 
detecting an error in the probability estimate during the error detection trials, r = .67, p < 
.01. Results suggest that participants’ understanding of the system, gained during the 
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practice trials, was associated with their ability to detect an error in probability estimates 
during the error detection trials.  
 The accuracy for participants correcting the probability estimate ranged between 
54% - 92% (M = .75, SD = .43). A Pearson correlation was performed between the 
average accuracy by participant during the practice trials and the average accuracy for 
correcting the probability estimate during the error detection trials, r = .3, p > .05. Results 
are not consistent with the multifunction mental model hypothesis.  
 There was a statistically significant relationship between participants ability to 
accurately detect an error in the probability estimate and their ability to correct the error 
in the probability estimate, r = .73, p < .01.  
  Based on quantitative results from novices alone it is unclear how specialized 
knowledge would influence performance on many of these sensemaking operations. 
Therefore, an attempt was made to collect data from experts in weather forecasting. Only 
one participant was recruited. The participant was a coursework completed PhD student 
in atmospheric sciences. In addition to asking this participant to run asking this 
participant the seven post-hoc interview questions and asking them to explain their 
thought processes while detecting error in the sensor report they were also asked specific 
questions about their knowledge of weather forecasting and how it related to the tasks. 
The participant indicated that their specialized knowledge did not influence how they 
responded to the task. The participant was also asked about the ecological validity of the 
features to how weather operated in the real world. They reported that at least some of the 
features and their weights was consistent with what they knew about how weather 
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operated, particularly, for the area where the task was held. Cloud cover would be a poor 
indicator because in the area where the task was given it is frequently cloudy, therefore, 
not a good indicator of a storm. 
 Results in Experiment 4b closely follow results found in Experiment 4a. Table 9, 
shows the analyses for testing for the multifunction mental model hypothesis across all 
experiment. Evidence was found across many of the sensemaking operations. However, 
not all analyses supported the MMM hypothesis. For example, average accuracy in 
probability estimates and correcting probability estimates in Experiment 4b. Explanations 
for the mixed results will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 8: General Discussion 
The present research investigated combining methods from both micro- and 
macrocognitive paradigms in order to create unique advantages. The primary process 
under investigation, sensemaking, and its supporting function mental models, are not 
traditionally evaluated using empirical methods. One of the goals of this research was to 
take another step closer to complimenting existing methods used to study mental models, 
such as Cognitive Task Analysis (Klein & Hoffman, 2008). In this thesis quantitative and 
qualitative data was used to infer how people think about the system they were operating. 
The structure of participants’ mental models was inferred based on their performance 
while operating the simulated weather forecasting system and responses to qualitative 
assessment. 
There were four hypotheses of the present research. (1) MMM hypothesis; 
performance of one sensemaking operation is predictive of performance of other related 
sensemaking operations. (2) Through brief instruction and feedback, mental models are 
developed that involve understanding the relational structure between inter-correlated and 
independent feature(s). (3) Understanding of the relational structure of the features can be 
used to make error correction decisions. (4) The strategies that utilize the inter-correlated 
nature of the features can be recognized and verbalized by users. 
Experiment 1 suggested through brief instruction, visual feedback, and audio 
feedback that participants created a mental model of the system which related all eight 
differentially weighted features to the probability estimates. This evidence was consistent 
with hypothesis 2. Some evidence was also gathered for the MMM hypothesis; 
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evacuation decisions were closely related to probability estimates. This suggests that 
initial learning through feedback from making probability estimates was also used to 
make evacuation decisions. Experiment 2 was designed to extend testing for other vital 
sensemaking operations. Consistent with the MMM hypothesis Experiment 2 suggested 
that participants’ mental model of the simulated system while making probability 
estimates was strongly associated with participants’ ability to make correct blame 
attributions. Results from Experiment 3 largely replicated results from Experiment 2.  
Experiments 4a-4b were extensions of Experiments 1-3. There were two 
differences between Experiments 4a and 4b. (1) How the hidden statistical model created 
the “true” probability estimates. (2) In Experiment 4b the probability estimate was 
removed from the screen when the error detection in the sensor report questions were 
asked. Experiments 4a and 4b were designed to test whether participants can make 
probability estimates, detect, diagnose, and correct errors by using inter-correlated 
features. Making accurate error detection, diagnosis, and correction determinations 
requires a different mental strategy and computation compared to independent features 
alone, as illustrated in the example in Chapter 1. Participants’ accuracy in making their 
weather predictions (in the form of probability estimates) was used as an empirical 
measure of the quality of participants’ mental models of the simulated weather 
forecasting system in addition to responses from the qualitative assessment.  
Results from both Experiments 4a & 4b supported the second hypothesis; 
performance when making error detection decisions was consistent with understanding 
the relational structure between the inter-correlated and independent features. However, 
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surprisingly results also suggested participants incorrectly incorporated the independent 
and irrelevant piece of information when making their error detection decisions. Results 
from both Experiments also supported hypothesis 3, error correction decisions were made 
by incorporating the relational structure of the inter-correlated features. Assessment of 
qualitative data suggested that as a result of manipulations between Experiment 4a and 4b 
participants were more likely to learn the accurate relations between features (i.e. have a 
more accurate mental model of the simulated system) in Experiment 4b compared to 4a. 
However, results from Experiment 4a was still consistent with the fourth hypothesis; 
there was a statistically significant relation between verbalized strategies and 
performance when making error detection decisions. While results from both 
Experiments supported hypotheses 2-4 the results for the first hypothesis is somewhat 
mixed. 
Across experiments results generally supported the MMM hypothesis; 
performance on one task was predictive of performance on other related tasks (see Table 
9). However, this was not consistent for each related task. Each of these relations will be 
briefly reviewed. Do to the nature of how the hidden statistical model produced the “true” 
probability estimate in Experiment 4a, participants did not need to understand the inter-
correlated nature of the features to make accurate probability estimates. Therefore, a 
participant could be fairly accurate while making probability estimates and be entirely 
unaware of the inter-correlated nature of the features. This likely explains the lack of a 
statistically significant relation between performance when making probability estimates 
and sensitivity to the inter-correlated nature of the features when making error detection 
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decisions for Experiment 4a. This result is also consistent with operating an intelligent 
tool in more naturalistic settings. Operators could have aspects of their mental model of 
the intelligent tool that are entirely inaccurate and still be able to operate the tool for 
certain sensemaking operations. The second relation that did not support the MMM 
hypothesis was between performance when making probability estimates and 
performance when making sensor error corrections. The lack of a statistically significant 
relation could suggest that some functions transfer during initial learning of the task 
while others do not. Performance when making sensor error corrections could require 
further knowledge or a better mental model of the system not achieved through feedback 
while making probability estimates. Future studies could test if initial learning while 
making error corrections transfers to making probability estimates. Other possible 
explanation could be some participants misunderstood the task. However, the average at 
making accurate error corrections was higher than chance. Finally, the lack of a 
statistically significant relation between performance when making probability estimates 
and correcting probability estimates in Experiment 4b could be from an outlier, 
insufficient sample size, randomness, or once again suggest that the knowledge required 
to make the probability estimates is unique from the knowledge required to correct the 
probability estimates. Future studies should be done to help test for the relations analyzed 
in this thesis. 
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Table 9: Results across experiments testing for evidence for the MMM hypothesis. 
Function Exp1 Exp2 Exp3 Exp4a Exp4b 
Probability Estimates and 
Evacuation Decisions 
r = .81**             
Probability Estimates and 
blame attributions  
 r = .9** r = .92**   
Probability Estimates and using 
sensor feature weights to 
correct probability estimates 
 r = -.68** r = -.34   
Probability Estimates and 
sensitivity to inter-correlation 
   r = .1 r = .44* 
Probability Estimates and 
sensor error detection 
   r = .4* r = .49* 
Probability Estimates and 
sensor error correction 
   r =-.12 r =.26 
Probability Estimates and error 
detection in probability 
estimates 
   r = .4* r = .67** 
Probability Estimates and error 
correction in probability 
estimates 
   r = .65** r = .3 
Qualitative data on sensitivity 
to feature correlation and 
sensor error detection accuracy 
   r = .53* NA 
**p < .01;* p < .05. 
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 Since the 1970’s there has been a concern about all the different microcognitive 
processes fitting together (Newell, 1973). Specifically, by becoming increasingly narrow 
in investigation, there is concern that there will be little transfer or generalizability 
(Gozli, 2017). Unfortunately, not much has changed (Hommel & Colzato, 2015). 
Experimental researchers often only study microcognition outside of the larger process 
that they are supporting (Hommel & Colzato, 2015). However, the present research 
provides some evidence that suggests a larger cognitive system can be analyzed within 
the lab; combing advantages of empirical analysis, systematic analysis, and qualitative 
assessment.  
 Error detection, diagnosis, and correction are a part of good decision making 
within human-machine systems. Mental models are necessary for system error detection, 
diagnosis, correction, and many other vital functions. To the extent that we have a better 
understanding of how people form and use mental models, we can more adequately 
enable people to perform more efficiently and effectively in changing and unexpected 
environments. Across experiments results generally supported the MMM hypothesis. If 
the MMM hypothesis is true then there may be implications for training and learning 
transfer. Performance for one cognitive operation while operating an intelligent tool was 
predictive of many other cognitive processes when operating the same intelligent tool. 
This is consistent with research being conducted on Experiential User Guides (EUG); 
which suggests that training in some sensemaking operations (such as error detection and 
diagnosis) helps refine operators mental models and therefore improve performance for 
other sensemaking operations while operating the same intelligent tool (Mueller & Klein, 
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2011). Consistent with this research the present results indicate there is a certain subset of 
organized knowledge (or mental model) of the intelligent tool users are interacting with 
that can be built and refined and adapted to different related tasks when interacting with 
an intelligent tool. Therefore, training in multiple sensemaking operations may be useful 
for refining the mental model of the intelligent tool and that refinement will likely 
increase performance of other tasks when operating the intelligent tool.  
This research also expands upon previous research conducted using inter-
correlated features. Previous research has suggested people do incorporate negatively 
correlated features in their decision making as measured by an increase in deliberation 
time (Fasolo et al., 2007). However, learning and the use of inter-correlated features for 
accomplishing complex goals has been relatively unexplored. This use of inter-correlated 
features impacts all of the sensemaking operations. Results from Experiments 4a-4b 
suggest that participants can learn associations between weighted inter-correlated features 
and therefore incorporate this understanding into their mental models of the intelligent 
tool they are operating.  
In addition to learning the inter-correlated nature of the features, results also 
suggested that participants use some irrelevant information to make error detection and 
correction decisions, despite never being provided with feedback or instruction to do so. 
This could be the result of the initial mental model and frame participants come into the 
lab with before they even start the task. The mental model within the data/frame theory 
contains background knowledge which is valuable for explaining how the system 
operates. It could be the case that participants already have a frame and mental model that 
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related all of the features together and not enough feedback was provided that challenged 
their frame and mental model to be refined (Klein et al., 2006b). Many laboratory studies 
do not consider learning and prediction by using inter-correlated vs. independent features 
(e.g. Gluck et al. (2002)). Future microcognitive studies may need to control for 
interpretation of features being inter-correlated. Future research should could also test 
whether it is generally adaptive to have an initial frame or mental model that contains a 
structure of inter-correlated features.  
 Across experiments there was variability in participants’ performance when 
making probability estimates and no participant was completely accurate. In verbal 
reports some participants described having different baselines for creating there 
probability estimates. Some participants started at zero before incorporating information 
from the sensor report, some started at .5, while others started at .75. This is consistent 
with previous research on the use of improper linear models; people generally perform 
poorly when making predictions from integrating information (Dawes, 1979). Therefore, 
results help support the notion of using proper linear models. 
Limitations 
There are some notable limitations to the present research. First, the sample was 
taken from an undergraduate college population. It is unclear whether results will 
generalize to other populations. It is also unclear how results would generalize to other 
more naturalistic settings. Future research should validate these finding in more 
naturalistic settings with experts. Experts may be better equipped to ignore the irrelevant 
piece of information when making error detection and correction decisions.  
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Conclusion 
Sensemaking is a vital process for a number of diverse operations, but little 
research has been conducted on sensemaking within the lab. This thesis describes 
research on studying a macrocognition process within a microcognition world. By 
combing methods from both micro- and macrocognitive paradigms future research will 
provide useful insight into how to create trainings and interventions to make 
sociotechnical systems more efficient and enduring. Based on data across four 
experiments results generally supported the MMM hypothesis. This has implications for 
training; training in multiple sensemaking operations may be useful for refining the 
mental model of the intelligent tool and that refinement will likely increase performance 
of other tasks when operating the intelligent tool.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66                                                                      MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION 
 
References 
(NOAA), N. C. F. E. I. (2018). Global Forecast System (GFS)   Retrieved from 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access/model-data/model-datasets/global-
forcast-system-gfs.   https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access/model-data/model-
datasets/global-forcast-system-gfs 
Alberts, D., & Garstka, J. (2004). Network centric operations conceptual framework 
version 2.0. US Office of Force Transformation and Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, US Department 
of Defense, Tech. Rep.  
Ancona, D. (2012). Framing and Acting in the Unknown. S. Snook, N. Nohria, & R. 
Khurana, The Handbook for Teaching Leadership, 3-19.  
Berger, E. (2017). US forecast models have been pretty terrible during Hurricane Irma.   
Retrieved from https://arstechnica.com/science/2017/09/us-forecast-models-have-
been-pretty-terrible-during-hurricane-irma/ 
Cacciabue, P. C., & Hollnagel, E. (1995). Simulation of cognition: Applications. 
Expertise and technology: Cognition and human-computer cooperation, 55-73.  
Casteel, M. A. (2016). Communicating Increased Risk: An Empirical Investigation of the 
National Weather Service's Impact-Based Warnings. Weather Climate and 
Society, 8(3), 219-232. doi:10.1175/Wcas-D-15-0044.1 
Craik, K. J. W. (1943). The nature of explanation. Cambridge Eng.: University Press. 
Crandall, B., Klein, G. A., & Hoffman, R. R. (2006). Working minds : a practitioner's 
guide to cognitive task analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION  67 
 
Dawes, R. M. (1979). The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision making. 
American Psychologist, 34(7), 571.  
Dervin, B. (1983). An overview of sense-making research: Concepts, methods, and 
results to date. Paper presented at the International Communications Association 
Dallas. 
https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/2281/Dervin83a.htm 
Dervin, B., & Naumer, C. (2009). Sense-making. Encyclopedia of communication theory 
(2 ed., pp. 876-880). 
Ebbinghaus, H. (1913). Memory: A contribution to experimental psychology: Genesis 
Publishing Pvt Ltd. 
Fallon, C. K., Murphy, A. K., Zimmerman, L., & Mueller, S. T. (2010). The calibration 
of trust in an automated system: A sensemaking process. Paper presented at the 
Collaborative Technologies and Systems (CTS), 2010 International Symposium. 
Fasolo, B., McClelland, G. H., & Todd, P. M. (2007). Escaping the tyranny of choice: 
When fewer attributes make choice easier. Marketing Theory, 7(1), 13-26.  
Fitts, P. M. (1946). German applied psychology during World War II. American 
Psychologist, 1(5), 151-161.  
Forrester, J. W. (1971). Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems. Theory and 
Decision, 2(2), 109-140. doi:10.1177/003754977101600202 
Gentner, D., & Stevens, A. L. (2014). Mental models. New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of 
bounded rationality. Psychological review, 103(4), 650-669.  
68                                                                      MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION 
 
Gluck, M. A., & Bower, G. H. (1988). From Conditioning to Category Learning - an 
Adaptive Network Model. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 117(3), 
227-247. doi:Doi 10.1037//0096-3445.117.3.227 
Gluck, M. A., Shohamy, D., & Myers, C. (2002). How do people solve the "weather 
prediction" task?: Individual variability in strategies for probabilistic category 
learning. Learning & Memory, 9(6), 408-418. doi:10.1101/lm.45202 
Gozli, D. G. (2017). Building Blocks of Psychology: on Remaking the Unkept Promises 
of Early Schools. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 1-24.  
Hoffman, R. R., LaDue, D. S., Trafton, J. G., Mogil, H. M., & Roebber, P. J. (2017). 
Minding the weather: How expert forecasters think. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press. 
Hommel, B., & Colzato, L. S. (2015). Learning from history: the need for a synthetic 
approach to human cognition. Frontiers in psychology, 6, 1435.  
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Towards a cognitive science of language, 
inference, and consciousness: Harvard University Press. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2001). Mental models and deduction. Trends in cognitive sciences, 
5(10), 434-442.  
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2004). Mental models and reasoning. In R. Sternberg & P. L. 
Jacqueline (Eds.), The nature of reasoning (pp. 169-204). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION  69 
 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2005). Mental models and thought. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. 
Morrison (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 185-
208). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2006). How we reason. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Jones, N. A., Ross, H., Lynam, T., Perez, P., & Leitch, A. (2011). Mental Models: An 
Interdisciplinary Synthesis of Theory and Methods. Ecology and Society, 16(1), 
46.  Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000289081200012 
Kaste, K. P. (2012). Naturalistic Study Examining the Data/Frame Model of 
Sensemaking by Assessing Experts in Complex, Time-Pressured Aviation 
Domains. (Master's thesis), Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.    
Kingstone, A., Smilek, D., & Eastwood, J. D. (2008). Cognitive Ethology: A new 
approach for studying human cognition. British Journal of Psychology, 99, 317-
340. doi:10.1348/000712607x251243 
Klein, G., & Hoffman, R. R. (2008). Macrocognition, mental models, and cognitive task 
analysis methodology. In J. M. Schraagen (Ed.), Naturalistic decision making and 
macrocognition (pp. 57-80). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Klein, G., Moon, B., & Hoffman, R. R. (2006a). Making sense of sensemaking 1: 
Alternative persepectives. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 21(4), 70-73. 
doi:10.1109/Mis.2006.75 
Klein, G., Moon, B., & Hoffman, R. R. (2006b). Making sense of sensemaking 2: A 
macrocognitive model. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 21(5), 88-92.  Retrieved from 
<Go to ISI>://WOS:000241163500018 
70                                                                      MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION 
 
Klein, G., Phillips, J. K., Rall, E. L., & Peluso, D. A. (2007). A data-frame theory of 
sensemaking. Paper presented at the Expertise out of context: Proceedings of the 
sixth international conference on naturalistic decision making, New York, NY. 
Klein, G., Pliske, R., Crandall, B., & Woods, D. D. (2005). Problem detection. Cognition, 
Technology & Work, 7(1), 14-28.  
Klein, G., Ross, K. G., Moon, B. M., Klein, D. E., Hoffman, R. R., & Hollnagel, E. 
(2003). Macrocognition. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 18(3), 81-85. doi:Doi 
10.1109/Mis.2003.1200735 
McBride, S. E., Rogers, W. A., & Fisk, A. D. (2014). Understanding human management 
of automation errors. Theor Issues Ergon Sci, 15(6), 545-577. 
doi:10.1080/1463922X.2013.817625 
McDermott, R. (2011). Internal and external validity. In J. N. Druckman, D. P. Green, J. 
H. Kuklinski, & A. Lupia (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of experimental political 
science (pp. 27-40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Moray, N. (1999). Mental models in theory and practice. In D. Gopher & A. Koriat 
(Eds.), Attention and Performance XVII: Cognitive regulation of performance 
Interaction of theory and application (Vol. 17, pp. 223-258). Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Mueller, S. T., & Klein, G. (2011). Improving users' mental models of intelligent 
software tools. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 26(2), 77-83.  
MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION  71 
 
Mueller, S. T., & Piper, B. J. (2014). The Psychology Experiment Building Language 
(PEBL) and PEBL Test Battery. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 222, 250-259. 
doi:10.1016/j.jneumeth.2013.10.024 
Newell, A. (1973). You can't play 20 questions with nature and win: Projective 
comments on the papers of this symposium. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual 
information processing (pp. 283-310). New York: Academic Press. 
Norman, D. A. (1983). Some observations on mental models. In D. Gentner & A. Stevens 
(Eds.), Mental models (Vol. 7, pp. 7-14). New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Pirolli, P., & Russell, D. M. (2011). Introduction to this Special Issue on Sensemaking. 
Human-Computer Interaction, 26(1-2), 1-8. doi:10.1080/07370024.2011.556557 
Revell, K. M., & Stanton, N. A. (2012). Models of models: filtering and bias rings in 
depiction of knowledge structures and their implications for design. Ergonomics, 
55(9), 1073-1092.  
Richardson, M., & Ball, L. J. (2009). Internal representations, external representations 
and ergonomics: towards a theoretical integration. Theoretical Issues in 
Ergonomics Science, 10(4), 335-376.  
Rouse, W. B., & Morris, N. M. (1986). On Looking into the Black-Box - Prospects and 
Limits in the Search for Mental Models. Psychological Bulletin, 100(3), 349-363. 
doi:Doi 10.1037//0033-2909.100.3.349 
Schraagen, J. M., Klein, G., & Hoffman, R. R. (2008). The macrocognition framework of 
naturalistic decision making. In J. M. Schraagen, L. Militello, T. Ormerod, & R. 
72                                                                      MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION 
 
Lipshitz (Eds.), Naturalistic decision making and macrocognition. Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Schumacher, R. M., & Czerwinski, M. P. (1992). Mental models and the acquisition of 
expert knowledge. In R. Hoffman (Ed.), The psychology of expertise (pp. 61-79). 
New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Shipley, T. (1961). Classics in psychology. New York: Philosophical Library. 
Smieszek, H., & Rußwinkel, N. (2013). Micro-cognition and macro-cognition: trying to 
bridge the gap. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 10th Berlin Workshop 
on Human-Machine Systems: Foundations and Applications of Human-Machine 
Interaction, Berlin. 
Starbuck, W. H., & Milliken, F. J. (1988). Executives’ perceptual filters: What they 
notice and how they make sense. In D. Hambrick (Ed.), The Executive Effect: 
Concepts and Methods for Studying Top Managers (pp. 35-65). Greenwich: JAI 
Press. 
Vosniadou, S., & Brewer, W. F. (1992). Mental models of the earth: A study of 
conceptual change in childhood. Cognitive psychology, 24(4), 535-585.  
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the process of 
sensemaking. Organization Science, 16(4), 409-421. doi:10.1287/orsc.1050.0133 
 
 
 
MICRO- AND MACROCOGNITION  73 
 
Appendix A – Post-hoc Interview Questions 
Participants were instructed to consider the task of detecting an error in the sensor report 
and shown an example. 
1. What information did you have available to you when making these decisions? 
2. What did you look for when you made this decision? 
3. How did you know that what you were paying attention to was the correct 
information? 
4. Did you do anything to confirm what you were paying attention to was correct? 
5. Have you had any previous experience with this kind of task that helped you determine 
the correct response? 
6. What specific parts of the training or experience was helpful when making these 
decisions? 
7. What short cuts or strategies did you use when solving these problems? 
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Appendix B – Interview Response Examples 
When asked “what did you look for when you made this decision” participant 9 
responded “I was just trying to see if it correlated with the graph (therm) on the side. 
Also, if they didn’t go together if high waves and soil being under 40.” 
When asked about thought process on specific examples participant 9 responded “I was 
using both report and therm (probability estimate) I would say the chance would be a 
little bit higher. Using therm to determine if there was an error in the report because I 
didn’t understand when just looking at the report. I would say therm should be lower just 
because the soil being below 40 and waves being longer.” 
When asked “what short cuts or strategies did you use when solving these problems” 
participant 11 responded “my strategy was to look at how many arrows there were to low 
compare to the temp and see if I thought they lined up.” 
When asked about thought process on specific examples participant 11 responded “This 
one I’m looking at how many low arrows there are to high and I’m looking at the bar has 
changed. I feel like in this one since there are more low arrows, then high, the prediction 
is wrong. There’s something wrong in the features because of what’s shown on the 
temp.” 
When asked “What factors need to be considered before fixing the error participant 19 
responded “whether or not all three of these were the same and then figure out if which 
one was incorrect then you look at the soil moisture to help fix the problem.” 
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When asked about thought process on specific examples participant 19 responded “the 
soil moisture is there and the wave’s length and winds are the same direction. No error.” 
